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In this paper, we study a firm’s optimal lobby behavior and its effect on investment in 
pollution abatement capital. We develop a dynamic framework where a representative firm 
can invest in both abatement and lobby capital in response to a possible future increase in 
pollution tax. We show that when the firm lobbies against the scale of the tax increase at a 
predetermined date, it should act like an occasional lobbyer by investing a lump-sum 
(optimal) amount in the lobby capital only at that date. But, to delay the new tax, it should act 
like a habitual lobbyer by investing continuously and at increasing rates over an optimal time 
period. We show that lobby expenditure crowds out investment in abatement capital and that 
this effect is stronger the more efficient is the lobbying activity. Further, we show that while 
uncertainty about the magnitude of the tax reduces the firm’s incentive to lobby, uncertainty 
about the timing of the new tax increases it. 
 




Address for correspondence: 
 
Y. Hossein Farzin 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
University of California 







 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the main merits attributed to the market-based environmental regulations
such as pollution tax or tradable permits is that they give ﬁrms incentive to invest in
environmentally cleaner technologies. However, as is well understood from the clas-
sic works of Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Tullock (1980, 1989), and
Becker (1983, 1985), and the more recent contributions by Bernheim and Winston
(1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), and
Persson (1998), among others, in general, the regulatory outcomes depend on lobby
powers of the private interest groups. Thus, in reality, active lobbying by pollut-
ing ﬁrms counteracts both the design and eﬀectiveness of environmental regulations.
For instance, while the possibility of a future increase in pollution tax encourages
ﬁrms to invest in pollution abatement equipment, it also gives them incentive to
spend resources on lobby eﬀorts to mitigate the future tax increase. The lobby eﬀort
can either reduce the stringency of the regulation to be mandated (for example, a
smaller pollution tax increase, a larger amount of initial pollution permits, or a free
distribution of emission permits to existing ﬁrms), or delay the date at which the
regulation becomes eﬀective, or both. In either case, investment in lobbying against
environmental regulation may “crowd out” abatement investment: ﬁrms may ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to divert some of their resources from investment in pollution abatement
technologies to expenditures on lobby eﬀorts. This possibility raises a number of
important questions. For example, what are the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s optimal
lobby behavior? How would lobby expenditure aﬀect the timing or the stringency
of environmental policy? How does lobby aﬀect the ﬁrm’s path of investment in
abatement capital?
An insightful literature has emerged in recent years on the political economy of
environmental policy making. This literature typically concentrates on competition
1between two opposing lobby groups (industrialists and environmentalists) through
campaign contributions and examines the eﬀect of this competition on environmen-
tal policy outcome. For example, Bartsch, Rauscher and Thomas (1993) consider two
distinct settings: one in which the contributions by each lobby promotes the chance
of its favored political candidate being elected, while the environmental policy agenda
of the candidates are taken to be exogenously set, and the other where the lobbing
activities inﬂuence the existing government’s environmental policy. They show the
possibility that the interaction between the two interest groups may harm (beneﬁt)
them by raising (reducing) their lobby eﬀorts. Following Grossman and Helpman
(1994)’s menu auction model, Fredrikson (1997) considers the case of a small open
economy where the government’s probability of electoral success depends both on ag-
gregate campaign contributions and on aggregate social welfare. He shows that the
political equilibrium tax rate diﬀers from the Pigouvian rate and depends on lobby
group membership, the government’s weight on aggregate social welfare relative to
campaign contribution and the tax elasticity of pollution. Fredriksson and Gaston
(2000) examine the eﬀect of lobby and competition for capital on environmental gov-
ernance in a federal system. They argue that the move to centralized regulation
stimulates industry lobby against environmental regulation, thus explaining why in-
dustry lobby may be stronger at the federal level than at lower administration levels.
Gulati (1999) develops a general equilibrium model much in the spirit of the models
developed by Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) and Fredrikson (1997) to com-
pare the optimal pollution tax under a conventional social planner and a common
agency government. In her model, both capital owners and workers lobby to inﬂuence
the tax rate. She ﬁnds that while distributional consideration may compel the social
planner to use pollution tax to correct income inequality, the common agency gov-
ernment uses the optimal pollution tax to completely internalize the environmental
2externality without correcting the inequality.
In contrast to the foregoing studies, which consider competition between industry
and environmental lobby groups, several papers focus on industry lobby only and
examine its eﬀects on environmental policy. Thus, for example, Schleich and Orden
(2000) adopt Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) model to analyze the eﬀect of orga-
nized industry lobby on the domestic and trade policies when the home and foreign
country governments may act cooperatively or non-cooperatively. They show that
while governments choose the most eﬃcient policies from the set of available policies,
lobbies may prefer less eﬃcient policies. Further, the ineﬃcient trade policies, which
the industry lobby prefers, can result in higher environmental quality. Michaelis
(1994) departs from the conventional assumption in the theoretical literature that
the industry lobby acts as a single coalition with the same interest. He examines
a heterogeneous Cournot-Nash oligopoly with endogenous policy making where two
groups of ﬁrms (diﬀerentiated by their compliance costs) engage in strategic lobby-
ing by making campaign contributions to two rival political parties competing for
contributions.
Our paper diﬀers from the literature reviewed above in several signiﬁcant respects.
First, we abstract from the process by which lobby activity inﬂuences the outcome
of the regulator’s decision about the future tax rate. Rather, we consider a general
reduced-form relationship between the stock of lobby expenditure and the likely re-
sulting (political equilibrium) tax rate or the date of its implementation.1 Second, by
assuming that the lobby activity of the representative competitive ﬁrm is coordinated
by the industry lobby, we abstract from possibilities of free riding by ﬁrms in their
1By doing so, in eﬀect, we extend Farzin and Kort’s (2000) model to the more realistic situation
where the future tax rate and the date of its enactment are endogenized by the ﬁrm’s decision to
invest in lobby capital.
3lobby eﬀorts.2 Third, in contrast to the existing literature that analyzes the eﬀects
of lobby activity in a static framework, we develop a dynamic optimization model
to analyze the optimal decisions of a typical ﬁrm about investments both in lobby
activities and in abatement capital.
In response to the tax increase, the ﬁrm may invest in the stock of pollution abate-
ment equipment to lower the pollution intensity of its output, or in “lobby capital”
to inﬂuence the future emission tax policy. The pay oﬀ from “lobby investment” may
take the form of a smaller future tax increase, or a delay in the enactment date of
the tax increase, or both. To reﬂect one of the political economy features of environ-
mental policy legislation, we allow the policy mitigating impact of a given stock of
lobby capital to decline with time, i.e., past lobby expenditures are less eﬀective than
current ones in aﬀecting current policy making. This novel approach captures the
dynamic process of lobby activities, and includes as a special case the conventional
static approach that allows current policy to be aﬀected by current lobby contribu-
tions only. The dynamics of the abatement and lobby investments are speciﬁed in
the model setup in section 2.
We begin in section 3 with a simple situation where the eﬀective date of the tax
increase is known with certainty and not subject to the ﬁrm’s lobby activity. The
magnitude of the future tax increase, however, is assumed uncertain, giving the ﬁrm
an opportunity to invest in lobby eﬀorts to reduce the (expected) size of the increase.
We show that while the ﬁrm’s optimal abatement investment policy is to gradually
build up abatement capital stock towards a steady-state level, its optimal lobby policy
requires no lobby activity prior to the date of the tax increase but a once-and-for-all
(optimal) lump-sum lobby eﬀort immediately before that date. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
2To avoid the familiar free-riding problem, we assume that the lobby eﬀorts of ﬁrms are well coor-
dinated through a single lobby agency that acts on behalf of the polluting industry. This assumption
enables us to investigate a “representative” ﬁrm’s decision.
4that uncertainty about the magnitude of the future tax reduces the ﬁrm’s incentive to
lobby, thus mitigating the adverse eﬀect of uncertainty on investment in abatement
capital.
In section 4, we consider the case where the size of the future tax increase is
known with certainty and not amenable to the ﬁrm’s lobby activity, but the date of
implementation can be delayed by lobbying Again, the ﬁrm should gradually build
up its abatement capital stock towards a steady state level. However, the optimal
lobby policy in this case requires a gradually increasing level of lobby capital stock
right from the beginning until the policy changes. Further, in contrast to the case
of uncertainty about the size of the future tax, uncertainty about the timing of the
tax policy increases the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in lobbying, thereby aggravating
the adverse eﬀect of uncertainty on abatement investment. Concluding remarks are
given in section 5.
2 Model Setup
Consider a price taking ﬁrm whose output causes pollution damage that can be
reduced by abatement capital. Let qt be its output at time t,a n dg(qt) be the cost
of production, with g￿ > 0 and g￿￿ > 0. The emission from production is α(Kt)qt
where Kt is the abatement capital stock, with α￿ < 0 and α￿￿ > 0. Thus, for the same
output, higher abatement capital stock reduces the emission level at a decreasing
rate. Let It be the ﬁrms’ rate of investment in abatement capital, and the cost be
c(It),w i t hc￿ > 0 and c￿￿ > 0. Abatement capital depreciates at the rate of δ,s ot h e
equation of motion for Kt is given by
˙ Kt = It − δKt. (1)
Currently the ﬁrm pays a pollution tax τl for its emission. This tax rate may
5increase in the future, and the ﬁrm can lobby to reduce the magnitude of the increase,
or to delay its implementation. The eﬀectiveness of its lobbying at time t depends on
the stock of its “lobby capital” Bt. The lobby capital being a stock variable reﬂects
the variety of lobby processes: the ﬁrm can inﬂuence policy makers either through
continuous contacts or by discrete contributions. However, earlier contributions may
not be as eﬀective as current contributions. We capture this possibility by allowing
the lobby capital to depreciate, at rate γ.L e t lt b et h el o b b ye x p e n d i t u r er a t ea t
time t. The equation of motion for Bt is
˙ Bt = lt − γBt. (2)
Without loss of generality, we assume that B0 =0and K0 is low.
We consider two mechanisms by which Bt aﬀects the tax policy. First, lobbying
can reduce the possible magnitude of the tax increase. For example, if the regulation
governing the tax level, say the Clean Water Act, is scheduled to be renewed or
modiﬁed at a future date, the polluting ﬁrms may lobby to reduce the possible future
tax increase. Second, lobbying can delay a predetermined tax increase. For example,
the auto industry has been rather successful in delaying the government regulation
on low-emission cars.
3 Lobby Against the Magnitude of Tax Increases
In this section, we study the optimal lobby eﬀort when lobby can reduce the magni-
tude of the tax increase. We ﬁrst study an uncertain tax increase, and then compare
it with the case of an equivalent deterministic tax increase to study the eﬀects of
uncertainty.
63.1 Optimal Lobby Under Uncertainty
Suppose the time of the tax increase is ﬁxed at T>0, but the level of the tax
change is undecided. Without loss of generality, let the possible future tax rate τ
be uniformly distributed on [τl,τh(BT)],w i t hτ￿
h < 0 and τ￿￿
h > 0.T h u s , l o b b y i n g
can reduce, at decreasing returns to scale, the upper bound of the (uncertain) tax
increase, and it is the lobby capital at the moment of the tax change that matters.
After time T, the ﬁrm has no incentive to lobby since the new policy has already
been determined. That is, lt =0for t>T. Because lobby capital B depreciates, and
it is the stock at moment T that aﬀects the new policy, the ﬁrm has no incentive to
s p e n do nl o b b y i n gb e f o r eT either. That is, lt =0for t<T. The optimal strategy is
to invest in the lobby capital at the moment of the policy change. The capital stock
BT jumps from zero to the optimal level B∗
T: BT+ −BT− = B∗
T.T h eﬁ r mi st h u sa n
“occasional lobbyer” (Morck, et al. 2001), engaging in lobby activities only when the
policy change is imminent.
For t ≥ T and given the lobby stock BT, the ﬁrm observes the new tax rate





e−r(t−T)[p(t)q(t) − g(q(t)) − τα(K(t))q(t) − C(I(t))]dt, (3)
subject to (1), with K(T)=KT, and the exogenously given price process {p(t),t≥
T}.
At any t,g i v e npt, Kt,a n dτ, the optimal output level q∗
t is given by the static
ﬁrst order condition pt − τα(Kt)=g (qt).S i n c eα  < 0 and g(·) is convex, we know
q∗
t is increasing in Kt. Substituting q∗ into (3), we obtain the per period proﬁt as
π(τ,K)=pq∗(p,τ,K) − g(q∗) − τα(K)q∗. (4)
Then (3) becomes a standard optimal control problem with one state (Kt) and one
control (It) variables. There is a unique steady state to the optimal solutions,
7(I∗,K∗), which is a saddle point. Along the (unique) optimal path, both I∗
t and
K∗
t are monotone in t. As a result, we can show through the phase diagram that if
the initial abatement capital KT is higher, the optimal capital K∗
t is higher and the
optimal investment rate I∗
t is lower, along the entire path before reaching the steady
state (see Appendix A). That is, K∗
t is increasing and I∗
t is decreasing in KT for all
T<t<∞.
Note that the steady state is independent of KT: it is unique, determined entirely
by the abatement technology, cost of abatement investment, and the new tax rate τ.























As the capital stock K∗
t increases, the pollution intensity α(K∗
t ) decreases, but the
output q∗
t increases. For our problem to be interesting, we make the following intuitive
assumption:
Assumption 1 Given price p and tax τ, the total pollution, α(K)q∗(p,τ,K),d e -
creases in the stock of abatement capital K.
This is the case if the output response to a higher K is smaller than the response
of the pollution intensity.3 Then, since K∗
t increases in KT,w ek n o wJKTτ > 0:t h e
marginal value of the capital stock KT increases in the future tax rate.
Let V (KT,B T)=Eτ|τh(BT)J(KT,τ) be the ﬁrm’s expected future payoﬀ after
period T.S i n c eτh(BT) is decreasing in BT,a st h el o b b yc a p i t a lBT rises, the dis-
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q are the elastici-
ties of α and q in K. Thus total pollution αq decreases in K if | 
α
K| > | 
q
K|.
8JKT is monotone increasing in τ (noting that JKTτ > 0), we know the marginal ex-
pected value of the abatement capital stock at T, VKT = Eτ|τh(BT)JKT, decreases as
BT rises. That is, being able to lobby down the future tax rate reduces the marginal
value of the “starting” capital stock after the tax change.





e−rt[p(t)q(t) − g(q(t)) − τlα(K(t))q(t) − C(I(t))]dt
+ e−rT [V (K(T),B T) − BT],
(6)
subject to (1), with K(0) = K0, B0 =0 , K(T) free, and the exogenously given price















Further, from the ﬁrst order conditions, we can show that, since VKTBT < 0,b e i n g
able to lobby reduces the abatement investment It for all t<T.
Therefore, the discrete lobby expenditure reduces the abatement investment con-
tinuously before the policy change, and results in a smaller ending abatement capital
stock. After the tax change, depending on the new tax rate τ, the investment rate It
may jump initially. It is smooth again afterwards. Before the tax change, the lobby
expenditure “crowds out” abatement expenditure by reducing the latter’s marginal
value. After the tax change, the expected abatement investment is reduced because
the tax rate is expected to be smaller.
3.2 The Eﬀects of Uncertainty
To show the eﬀects of uncertainty, we consider the optimal lobby behavior under





9Thus, ˆ τ(BT) is the expected tax rate, and its reduction in response to lobby capital
BT equals the expected r e d u c t i o ni nt h eu n c e r t a i n t yc a s e .
Similar to the case of uncertainty, we can show that the optimal lobby behavior
is to immediately raise the lobby capital at moment T to its optimal level, denoted




Comparing (7) and (9), we know that the ﬁrm has less incentive to lobby under







We show in Appendix B that
Proposition 1 Suppose either (i) the uncertainty level is low (i.e., τh −τl is small)
or (ii) Jττττ(KT,τ)=0 . Then a suﬃcient condition for (10) is Jτττ(KT,τl) ≥ 0.
Thus, if the problem in (6) is linear quadratic (i.e., if the ﬁrm’s instantaneous
payoﬀ function is quadratic), the suﬃcient conditions in the Proposition are satisﬁed.
The major underlying intuition for (10) is that the beneﬁt function J(BT,τ) is convex
in τ (Appendix B).4 Thus, all else equal, the ﬁrm would prefer to face a larger tax
uncertainty. However, in the case of uncertainty, the lobby capital, by reducing τh,
reduces the expected tax as well as the uncertainty of the tax. The ﬁrm is thus less
willing to lobby. The conditions in Proposition 1 guarantee that other features of the
curvature of J(·) are dominated by the eﬀects of the convexity of J(·).
Since dEJ/dBT > 0 and dJ(KT,ˆ τ)/dBT > 0, (10) indicates that the marginal
beneﬁt of the lobby capital under uncertainty is smaller than that under certainty.
4To understand the convexity, note that if after time T, the ﬁrm sticks to a ﬁxed abatement
investment path for all values of τ, (3) shows that the value function J(·) would be decreasing and
linear in τ. Of course, as τ varies, the ﬁrm will adjust its investment path accordingly to reduce the
decrease in J(·), making J(·) convex in τ.
10Thus, compared with the certainty case, Proposition 1 shows that under plausible
conditions, uncertainty reduces the incentive of the ﬁrm to lobby. Farzin and Kort
(2000) showed that uncertainty also reduces the ﬁrm incentive to invest in abatement
capital. Thus, although lobbying crowds out abatement investment, the presence of
lobbying can also mitigate the negative eﬀects of uncertainty on abatement invest-
ment.
4 Lobby Against the Timing of a Higher Tax
Suppose the magnitude of the tax increase has been decided, but the ﬁrm can lobby
to postpone the implementation of the new tax rate. This scenario may arise if the
tax increase is mandated by a legislation, but the enforcing agency (e.g. the EPA) is
left to determine the actual time table of implementation.
Let τh >τ l be the new tax rate that has been ﬁxed, and T be its eﬀective date
that the ﬁrm may inﬂuence. To build up intuition, we consider ﬁrst a deterministic
model.
4.1 The Deterministic Scenario
We ﬁrst specify the lobby technology, or how eﬀective the lobby capital stock B is
in delaying the new rate. Deﬁne ∆(t,B) as the additional length of delay of the new
tax given that the policy has been delayed up to time t. We assume that ∆t < 0,
∆tt < 0, ∆B > 0, ∆BB < 0,a n d∆tB < 0. That is, given any lobby capital, as
the new tax has been delayed for a longer time (or as t increases), it becomes more
d i ﬃ c u l ta ta ni n c r e a s i n gr a t et of u r t h e rd e l a yi t .A ta n yt i m e ,h i g h e rl o b b yc a p i t a l
causes more delay of the new tax, but at a decreasing rate. Further, as time goes
by, the lobby capital becomes less eﬀective. Figure 1 graphs the isoquant in t and B:
∆(t,B)=a, a ﬁxed number. We can show that along the isoquant, dB/dt > 0 and
11 
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Figure 1: Isoquant of the Lobby Technology
d2B/dt2 > 0.T h u sa st rises, it requires increasingly more and more lobby capital to
delay the new tax by a periods.
Suppose the ﬁrm decides to delay the new tax until time T. Intuitively, given the
decreasing returns of the lobby capital, before T, the ﬁrm should lobby just enough to
keep the tax not implemented. That is, it should choose B(t) so that ∆(t,B(t)) = 0
(or  ). This intuition is conﬁrmed in the following Proposition, the proof of which is
in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 Regardless of the abatement investment path {I(t),K(t)},t h el e a s t
cost way of delaying the new tax until time T requires B(t) such that ∆(t,B(t)) = 0
for all t   T.
Solving ∆(t,B(t)) = 0,w eo b t a i nt h eo p t i m a ll o b b yc a p i t a ls t o c kB∗(t) and the
required lobby investment l∗(t). From the characteristics of ∆(t,B),w ek n o wB∗(t)
is increasing at an increasing rate over time: ˙ B∗ > 0, ¨ B>0.S i n c e l = ˙ B + γB,
12we know ˙ l∗(t) > 0.T h eﬁ r m ’ sb e h a v i o ro fc o n t i n u o u sl o b b y i n gi ss i m i l a rt ot h a to f
“habitual lobbyers” (Morck, et al.). Its lobby expenditure increases overtime, and
its lobby capital increases at an increasing rate overtime (thus the lobby expenditure
more than oﬀsets the depreciation of the lobby capital).
The ﬁrm’s overall optimization problem is one of choosing the level of abatement











subject to (1). We form two Hamiltonians H1 = π(τl,K)−C(I)−l∗(t)+λ1(I −δK)
for t   T,a n dH2 = π(τh,K) − C(I)+λ2(I − δK) for t>T . In addition to the
regular necessary conditions, we have the following conditions:
H1(T)=H2(T),λ 1(T)=λ2(T). (12)
We assume that the optimal T is in (0,∞) to avoid corner solutions.
From the ﬁrst order conditions on I(t),w ek n o wf r o mH1 that C (I(T−)) = λ1(T)
and from H2 that C (I(T+)) = λ2(T). (12 then implies that I(t) is continuous at
time T, and consequently K(T−)=K(T+). Therefore, H1(T)=H2(T) implies that
l∗(T)=π(τl,K(T)) − π(τh,K(T)). (13)
This equation uniquely determines the optimal time of the new policy (or optimal
length of delay). To see this, notice that the LHS of (13) measures the marginal cost
of delaying the new tax rate, and is increasing over time. The RHS measures the
increased proﬁt due to, or the marginal beneﬁt of, delaying the new tax. Its time
path is described by
[πK(τl,K t) − πK(τh,K t)] ˙ K(t). (14)
Applying the envelope theorem to (4), we know πK(τ,K)=−τα (K).F u r t h e r ,
through a phase-diagram analysis, we show in Appendix C that K(t) is monotone
13in time, and that since K0 is low, ˙ K(t) > 0 for all t>0. So, the RHS of (13) is
decreasing in T. Consequently, the optimal time of the new tax T is unique. (13)
indicates that
Proposition 3 The ﬁrm should delay the new tax rate until the marginal lobby ex-
penditure required to delay the policy equals the marginal beneﬁt of delaying the policy.
The optimal time of the new tax is unique.
The equations of motion for λ1 and λ2 are
˙ λ1 =( r + δ)λ1 + τlα￿(K)
˙ λ2 =( r + δ)λ2 + τhα￿(K),
which indicates that ˙ λ1(T) > ˙ λ2(T) because λ1(T)=λ2(T).S i n c e K0 is low and
K(t) is monotone, we know after time T, the system approaches the steady state
f r o mt h el e f ti nF i g u r e5 . T h e nf o rt>T , I(t) decreases, and since C￿(I)=λi for
i =1 ,2, λ2(t) decreases.
Figure 2 depicts the paths of λ1(t) and λ2(t),w h i c hc r o s sa tt i m eT. The path of
λ2(t) is independent of the decision on T: from the phase diagram in Figure 5, the
path of λ2(t) is determined entirely by the location of the steady state. Thus as the
optimal switch time T changes, only the λ1(t) path changes: since the costate variable
measures the present value of all future contributions of more capital stock now, the
timing of a future higher tax would aﬀect λ1(t).T h u sa sT is further delayed, say if
the lobby technology becomes more eﬃcient, or l∗(t) decreases, the path of λ1(t) must
shift down in Figure 2. Consequently, I(t) must decrease for t<T.F u r t h e r ,a tt h e
time of the policy switch, λ2(T) is smaller the higher is T. Therefore, I(T) is smaller,
and from Figure 5, I(t) must be smaller for t>Tas well. In particular, the optimal
path changes from (V) to (VII). Thus K(T) must be higher. From (13), the diﬀerence
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Figure 2: Time Paths of the Costate Variables
savings from a lower tax rate is lower. (We can verify that πτK = −α￿(K)q∗ > 0.)
Thus l∗(T) is lower. In summary, we know
Proposition 4 As the lobby technology becomes more eﬃcient, (i) the implemen-
tation time of the new tax rate will be delayed; (ii) the abatement investment I(t)
decreases both before and after the new tax is implemented; (iii) the abatement capi-
tal stock at the time of tax rate change is higher, after balancing the lower investment
rate and the longer period of time before the new tax takes place; and (iv) the required
lobby expenditure at the time of policy change is smaller, again after balancing the
lower expenditure at each time period (due to higher lobby eﬃciency) and longer lobby
time.
4.2 The Stochastic Scenario
Suppose now that lobbying can only delay the implementation with a positive prob-
ability. In particular, let h(t,B) be the probability that the new tax rate is delayed
15g i v e nt h a ti th a sn o tb e e ni m p l e m e n t e dy e ta tt i m et.S i m i l a rt o∆(·), we assume that
ht < 0, htt < 0, hB > 0, hBB < 0,a n dhtB < 0. Thus the isoquant of h(t,B)=b,a
constant, is similar to that of ∆(t,B)=a in Figure 1.
W ek n o wf r o m( 3 )t h a tt h eﬁ r m ’ sn e tp a y o ﬀa f t e rt h en e wt a xr a t ei si m p l e m e n t e d
at time t is given by J(K,τh). Then at each moment before the implementation time,









[1 − h(t,B(t))]dtJ(K(t + dt),τh)




On the RHS, the ﬁrst line measures the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ in the “current” period, from t
to t+dt. The second and third lines measure the expected present value of the ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ, which has two components. If the new rate is not delayed (with probability
(1 − h)dt), the ﬁrm receives payoﬀ J(·). If the rate is successfully delayed (with
probability 1−(1−h)dt), the ﬁrm then has to redo the optimization problem for the
“next” period, receiving payoﬀ U(·).
Applying Taylor expansion to the RHS of (15), and ignoring higher order terms
of dt,w eg e t
rU =m a x
I,l
 
π(τl,K) − C(I) − l + dU/dt +( 1− h)(J − U)
 
, (16)
which is the arbitrage condition: the return of the payoﬀ U(·), rU,m u s te q u a lt h e
current payoﬀ plus the change in the total payoﬀ dU/dt, adjusted by the possibility
of a tax change. Substituting in the two state equations (1) and (2) gives






16The ﬁrst order conditions for I and l are
−C (I)+UK(t,K,B)=0




0 if UB < 1
free if UB =1
The optimal investment and lobby paths can be found from these equations if U(·)
is known.
Taking the derivative of (17) with respect to B and adjusting lead to
˙ UB =[ r + γ +(1− h)]UB − hB(U − J),











.T h i s






which measures the future expected beneﬁts of possibly having the lower tax rate. To
see this, note that hB(U −J) in period s measures the expected beneﬁt of increasing
the lobby stock by one unit if the period s can be reached, or if the new tax is delayed
until at least period s.B u tp e r i o ds may not be reached at all, since there is always
a probability of (1 − h) at each moment that the new tax rate is enacted. That is,
1−h(v,B(v)), v ∈ [t,s], is the hazard rate of a “sudden death” of the low tax rate τl.
Thus the period s beneﬁt hB(s,B(s))(U −J) must be discounted by the hazard rate,
leading to (1−h) in the discount factor. Further, since the lobby capital depreciates
at rate γ, the future beneﬁts must in addition be discounted at rate γ.
Suppose l(t) > 0 on a time interval. Then UB =1and ˙ UB =0 . Then the above
equation implies
r + γ +( 1− h(t,B)) = hB(t,B)(U(t,K,B) − J(K,τh)). (18)
17The RHS measures the “marginal payoﬀ” of increasing the lobby stock: the increase
in the probability of delaying the new policy multiplied by the payoﬀ of a successful
delay.
4.3 The Eﬀects of Uncertainty
Since h(t,B) is the probability of delaying the new tax by one period, and 1−h(t,B)
is the probability of no delay, the expected length of delay is h(t,B).T h u s , t h e r e
is a direct correspondence between h(t,B) and the length of delay ∆(t,B) in the
deterministic model. If the ﬁrm has the same lobby technology in the deterministic
and stochastic models, we would expect that h(t,B)=∆ ( t,B),a tl e a s tf o r∆ ￿ 1.
Therefore, to compare the lobby behaviors under certainty and uncertainty, we
only need to compare the equilibrium levels of h(t,B) and ∆(t,B).F r o m ( 1 8 ) , w e
know that as long as there is positive lobby expenditure, h(t,B) cannot be zero
for any positive length of time. (Otherwise, if h(t,Bt)=0for an interval of time,
hB =0on that interval, violating (18).) However, we know from Proposition 2 that
l o b b yu n d e rc e r t a i n t yo n l yg u a r a n t e e st h a t∆(t,Bt)=0 . Therefore, there is more
lobbying under uncertainty than under certainty. This is in direct contrast to the
case of lobbying against the magnitude of the tax, where the ﬁrm lobbies less under
uncertainty under plausible conditions.
5 Conclusion
Lobbying against (or for) regulation legislation by private interest groups is a fact of
economic life, at least in democratic societies. Within a dynamic framework, we have
analyzed the lobby behavior of polluting ﬁrms and its eﬀect on their investment in
pollution abatement capital. In our model, ﬁrms spend resources on lobbying with
the objective of either mitigating the magnitude of a future pollution tax increase
18or delaying its date of enactment. We have shown that the optimal lobby behavior
and its impact on abatement investment depends on the lobby objective pursued by
the ﬁrms. Thus, when the date of the pollution tax increase is ﬁxed but ﬁrms can
lobby to reduce its size, they behave like “occasional lobbyers” by spending a total
(optimal) amount only at the moment when the tax increase is due. Further, by
rendering abatement capital less valuable, the discrete lobby expenditure reduces the
rate of expenditure on abatement capital at all times- a “crowding out” eﬀect- thus
resulting in a smaller abatement capital stock and hence a higher pollution intensity
of output than would be the case without lobbying.
W eh a v en e x ta n a l y z e dt h ec a s ew h e r et h es i z eo ft h et a xi n c r e a s ei sa l r e a d y
legislated but ﬁrms can lobby to delay its enactment date according to a deterministic
lobby technology. For this case, we have shown that there is a unique optimal delaying
period and, contrary to the previous case, the ﬁrms’ optimal lobby behavior is similar
to that of “habitual lobbyers:” they should lobby continuously and at increasing rates.
Moreover, the more eﬃcient the lobby technology is the longer the optimal delaying
period and the more intense will be the crowding-out eﬀect of the lobby expenditure
on abatement investment, although, at the time of the policy change the abatement
capital stock will be larger and the required lobby expenditure will be smaller. The
“habitual lobbyers” behavior is shown to be optimal also for the case where the
lobby expenditure inﬂuences the probability of delaying the enactment date of the
new policy.
Depending on the type of lobbying, uncertainty can play opposite roles. For
occasional lobbyers who lobby against the magnitude of the tax, uncertainty reduces
his incentive to lobby. But for habitual lobbyists who lobby against the timing,
uncertainty raises his lobby expenditure. Thus, lobby can either mitigate or aggravate
the negative impacts of uncertainty on abatement investment.
19This research can be extended in several important directions. One can consider
the more general situation where the ﬁrm’s lobby expenditures may both mitigate
the magnitude of the pollution tax increase and delay the date at which the policy is
enacted. It is then possible to derive a number of insights about the characteristics
of the optimal paths of investment in lobbying and abatement capital. Optimal
lobbying would involve both continuous lobby investment before the policy change
and a jump in investment level immediately prior to the change. Further, where
the crowding-out eﬀect of lobby expenditure on abatement investment is deemed to
reduce social welfare, one can consider the options available to the government to
regulate the lobby activity. For example, the government agency may not be able to
eliminate lobbying, but can commit to either a time of policy change or a magnitude
of policy change to reduce the lobby eﬀectiveness. Which type of commitment is
more eﬃcient depends in part on the magnitude by which the continuous and the
discrete lobby expenditures crowd out the abatement investment. Finally, We have
not been speciﬁc about how the lobby expenditures are actually spent. In situations
where they take the form of contributions to electoral political campaigns or become
a source of public fund, as often considered in the literature, it would be interesting to
examine how their eﬀects on abatement investment would diﬀer from those analyzed
in this paper.
20A The Optimal Control Problem after Time T
Forming the Hamiltonian of the optimization problem in (3), we can show that the
ﬁrst order condition of I(t) is λ(t)=C￿(I(t)), which implies ˙ λ = C￿￿ ˙ I,w h e r eλ(t) is
the costate variable for K. The equation of motion for λ is ˙ λ = rλ + τα￿(K)q + λδ.








This equation and (1) form two diﬀerential equations in I(t) and K(t). Their phase
diagram in the K - I space is presented in Figure 3. In particular, the ˙ I =0curve
is downward slopping and the ˙ K =0curve is upward slopping. There is a unique
steady state and a unique saddle path approaching the steady state from both sides.
If KT <K ∗ (the steady state capital stock level), K(t) increases and I(t) decreases
along the optimal path. If KT >K ∗, K(t) decreases and I(t) increases along the
optimal path.





t b et h ec a p i t a ls t o c ka l o n gt h es a d d l ep a t ha tt i m et>T , starting
at K0
T and K1





t0>T.T h e n K1
t = K0
t+t0−T.S i n c e Kt is increasing in time, we know
K1
t >K 0
t : the abatement stock after T is increasing in the starting stock level KT.
Similarly, we can show that the investment rate It is decreasing in KT.
Consider an increase in τ. From (19), we know the ˙ I =0isoquant shifts out
in Figure 3, resulting in higher steady state levels of K and I,a sw e l la sah i g h e r
saddle path. Then, given the same starting KT,ah i g h e rτ leads to higher It and
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Figure 3: Phase Diagram
B Proofs of Propositions
























Appendix A shows that
dK∗
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t < 0 from Assumption 1.
Thus, J(KT,·) is convex.





To see this, note that (21) is equivalent to
￿ τh
τl
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Figure 4: Convexity of J(KT,τ)
The left hand side measures area A in Figure 4, while the right hand side measures
area B. Since J(KT,·) is convex, we know area A is larger than B.


















































where the inequality follows from (21) and the fact that dτh
dBT < 0. Applying third
order Taylor expansion of J(KT,τh) around τl, we know the term in the square
bracket of the last line in (22) approximately equals






Jτττ(KT,τl)(τh − τl)2. (23)
23Applying second order Taylor expansion of Jτ(KT,ˆ τ) around τl,w ek n o w
Jτ(KT,τl) − Jτ(KT,ˆ τ)=−Jττ(KT,τl)(ˆ τ − τl) −
1
2
Jτττ(KT,τl)(ˆ τ − τl)2. (24)







(τh − τl)2 −
1
2
(ˆ τ − τl)2
￿
.
We can easily verify that the term in the square bracket is positive. Thus if conditions
(i) or (ii) in the Proposition are satisﬁed, the errors in Taylor expansion are small
relative to the inequality in (22). The Proposition then follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given any abatement investment path {I(t),K(t)},







s.t. ∆(t,B(t)) ≥ 0, and (2), for t   T.
(25)
T h ec u r r e n tv a l u eH a m i l t o n i a ni sH(B(t),l(t),ρ(t)) = −l(t)+ρ(t)(l(t)−γB(t)),w h e r e
ρ(t) is the current value costate variable associated with B(t).T h e Lagrangian is
L = H + µ(t)∆(t,B),w h e r eµ(t) is associated with the inequality constraint.
The necessary conditions are
ρ(t)   1,l (t)=0 if ρ(t) < 1, and l(t) is free if ρ(t)=1 ,
˙ ρ = rρ+ γρ− µ∆B,
µ(t) ≥ 0, ∆(·) ≥ 0,µ ∆(·)=0 ,
and the constraints in the optimization problem. Since B0 =0 , l(t) > 0 for small
t,s a yf o rt ∈ [0,t 1] for some t1 <T .T h e n ρ(t)=1or ˙ ρ(t)=0for all t   t1.
Consequently µ(t)=( r + γ)ρ(t)/∆B > 0, which implies ∆(t,B(t)) = 0.F u r t h e r ,
immediately after t1, B(t) must be higher than B(t1) to make sure ∆(t,B(t)) ≥ 0
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Figure 5: Phase Diagram for Control Problem (11)
ρ(t)=1 ,o rµ(t) > 0,o r∆(t,B(t)) = 0 for t>t 1. Continuing this argument, we
know ∆(t,B(t)) = 0 for all t   T.
C Optimal Paths of the Control Problem (11)
The equation of motion ˙ I(t) is the same as (19), with τ replaced by τl and τh for
t ￿ T and t>Trespectively. Thus the phase diagram of the control problem, shown
in Figure 5, is similar to Figure 3, except that there are two ˙ I =0isoclines, one for
τ = τl and one for τ = τh. Only paths (V) and (VI) can reach the steady state S.
For example, on path (I), the system moves towards the origin under both τ = τl
and τ = τh.S i n c eK0 is small, we know the optimal path is (V).
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